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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely used
in many fields such as images processing, speech recognition;
however, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples, and this
is a security issue worthy of attention. Because the training
process of DNNs converge the loss by updating the weights along
the gradient descent direction, many gradient-based methods
attempt to destroy the DNN model by adding perturbations in
the gradient direction. Unfortunately, as the model is nonlinear in
most cases, the addition of perturbations in the gradient direction
does not necessarily increase loss. Thus, we propose a random
directed attack (RDA) for generating adversarial examples in this
paper. Rather than limiting the gradient direction to generate an
attack, RDA searches the attack direction based on hill climbing
and uses multiple strategies to avoid local optima that cause
attack failure. Compared with state-of-the-art gradient-based
methods, the attack performance of RDA is very competitive.
Moreover, RDA can attack without any internal knowledge of
the model, and its performance under black-box attack is similar
to that of the white-box attack in most cases, which is difficult
to achieve using existing gradient-based attack methods.
Index Terms—Deep neural network, adversarial example, ad-
versarial attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, deep neural networks (DNNs) occupy an unas-
sailable position in many fields of image processing [1], [2],
natural language processing [3], and speech recognition [4].
However, recent work has shown that DNN models, regardless
of classification accuracy, are susceptible to misclassification
because of perturbation noises that are difficult to detect by
the human eye. Further, studies found that the added distur-
bances might be transferable, i.e., they can simultaneously
deceive models with different structures. The mechanism of
intentionally adding subtle perturbations to cause a target
model to misclassify examples with high confidence is called
an adversarial attack; the disturbed example is called an
adversarial example [5].
The discovery of adversarial perturbations attracted a num-
ber of researchers to conduct an in-depth study on adversarial
learning. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [6] proposed the existence of
universal perturbation, i.e., a disturbance that can successfully
attack a sample can also be applied to a new sample and
to spoof the same network with high probability. Athalye et
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Fig. 1. Examples of attacks on the same image by FGSM and RDA based
on one-step attack. Left column: clean samples to be attacked. Middle
column: FGSM attack direction (top) and RDA attack direction (bottom),
and their included angle is 36.1◦. Right column: sample generated by FGSM
(top) and sample generated by RDA (bottom). FGSM fails, but RDA attacks
successfully. Note that in order to reduce the number of iterations, RDA stops
when the attack succeeds. Therefore, although the confidence of the error class
Cassette player is only 52.3%, the attack has been successful.
al. [7] found that real objects generated by adversarial sam-
ples through 3D printing techniques could also attack DNN
classifiers. Xie et al. [8] extended the adversarial examples
to the field of semantic segmentation; these examples were
wrongly segmented or detected. In addition to the adversarial
attacks in image classification, Carlini et al. [9] stated that
advanced speech-to-text models are susceptible to adversarial
perturbations, and any waveform given could be transcribed
into a specified text by adding an almost inaudible waveform.
Alzantot et al. [10] misclassified speech by changing the
unimportant parts of the speech segments. Ebrahimi et al. [11]
successfully attacked word-level classifiers by atomic flipping
operations and retaining semantic constraints.
Existing attack methods can be classified into white-box at-
tacks and black-box attacks based on the amount of knowledge
that can be obtained from the network [12]. In a white-box
attack, an attacker can obtain all the information about the
network (including model structure, weights, and even training
details). In a black-box attack, the attacker cannot obtain all the
information of the model; however, they only know the type
of data processed by the model and the common interactions
performed by the model, such as the outputs of the model. The
implementation of the black-box attack utilizes the character-
istics of the transferability of the adversarial perturbations, and
the attack is performed by delivering the adversarial examples
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2generated by the local model to the target model. Thus, an
effective black-box attack on the target model is often based on
an efficient white-box attack. Unfortunately, excellent white-
box attacks are poorly transferable, while highly transferable
methods tend to perform poorly [13]. Thus, the performance
of existing black-box attacks is generally unsatisfactory [14].
Training neural networks is a process that minimizes the loss
function along the gradient descent direction. Therefore, it is
natural to use gradient information to attack the trained model.
This type of methods must ensure that the gradient direction
of the input is towards the direction of increasing loss under
a subtle perturbation; however, the nonlinear model does not
necessarily satisfy this condition.
Because perturbations added along the gradient direction do
not necessarily successfully attack the sample, any other direc-
tions that can ensure a successful attack should be identified.
This paper proposes a random directional attack (RDA),
which uses hill climbing search to find the direction along
which a sample can be successfully attacked under a minor
disturbance. RDA uses the first-choice hill climbing algorithm
to find a successful direction, where only partial dimensions
are randomly selected at each iteration of hill climbing.
Experimental results on multiple datasets demonstrate that
the attack performance of RDA is competitive with state-of-
the-art gradient-based attack methods. In Fig. 1, we show
the results of fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [15] and
RDA attacking the same sample. FGSM has no effect on the
classifier, whereas RDA can cause model misclassification.
The primary contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows.
• Based on the fact that an attack is not necessarily in the
gradient direction, we propose RDA, which searches the
attack direction based on a random but directional search,
i.e., the first-choice hill climbing on random neighbors.
It implements a one-step attack on the direction that is
identified.
• RDA demonstrates its excellent attack performance in
white-box attacks. In particular, as a one-step attack
method, RDA is significantly better than the existing
FGSM. Although RDA uses the gradient of the target
model as the starting point under white-box attacks, it
could use the gradient of the substitute model under
black-box attacks, and it achieves a similar performance
to that of white-box attacks.
• The excellent attack performance of RDA confirms that
the effective attack direction may deviate from the gradi-
ent direction. We found that, for samples difficult to be
perturbed in the gradient direction, the effective attack
directions may deviate considerably from the gradient
direction.
• The experimental results show that the angles included
between the effective attack direction and the gradient
direction vary considerably, and there are no explicit laws.
This indicates that the adversarial region is randomly and
irregularly distributed. Thus, it is of great significance and
a great challenge to form a unified theory to explain the
adversary in DNNs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the vulnerability of DNNs and the specific work of
attacking and defending. Section III elaborates on the ideas
of the random directional attack and the procedure of the
algorithm. Section IV verifies the feasibility of RDA through
experiments. Finally, the last section provides a summary of
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first discuss the vulnerability of DNNs.
Second, we list some classical methods for generating adver-
sarial examples. Finally, we introduce some studies related to
defending against these adversarial examples.
A. Vulnerability of DNNs
Considerable work has been invested in studying the vulner-
ability of DNNs, i.e., why do there exist so many adversarial
examples. Szegedy et al. studied the adversarial examples in
2013 [5]. At that time, the general view was that the highly
nonlinear characteristics of DNNs were the main reason for the
existence of adversarial examples. DNNs could not fully learn
the completely generalized features of data, and therefore,
these perturbed examples were randomly and low-probably
distributed in a high-dimensional network model space [5].
However, Goodfellow et al. [15] argued that adversarial per-
turbations are attributed to the fact that the neural network is
too linear, such as LSTM and ReLU, which are intentionally
designed to be very linear. Tanay et al. [16] questioned the
linear interpretation of the network and proposed that it is easy
to generate adversarial examples when the decision boundary
of the classifier is located near the submanifold of the data.
According to experimental comparisons of various denoising
algorithms, Gu et al. [17] concluded that the vulnerability of
DNNs has very little to do with the structure of the selected
model; however, it is related to the training process and the
defects of the objective function used. Tabacof et al. [18]
used various noises to probe the pixel space of the image and
concluded that adversarial perturbations are prone to occur in
a large area of the pixel space. Cubuk et al. [19] attributed
the occurrence of adversarial perturbations to the inherent
uncertainty of the statistics of the logit differences of model,
and the uncertainty does not change significantly in learning,
which makes different neural networks have different robust-
ness. Through the study of adversarially robust generalization,
Schmidt et al. [20] showed that the robustness of the model
strongly depends on the distribution of the data; however,
it is independent of the specific category of training, and
the standard linear classifier is more robust than the others.
Bubeck et al. [21] argued that the reason for the occurrence
of perturbations in a high-dimensional classifier is because of
the computational limitation of the learning algorithms. Ilyas et
al. [22] proposed that adversarial examples originate from the
existence of non-robust features that are difficult for humans
to understand and capture in experimental datasets. Stutz et al.
[23] demonstrated that the adversarial perturbations exist both
outside the manifold and in the manifold, and they proposed
that adding the adversarial examples in the manifold to training
data is helpful in improving the generalization ability of the
model.
3B. Adversarial Attack
An adversarial attack finds a minor perturbation that can
cause sample misclassification. We can transform it into an
optimization problem. Let the classifier be F , the image to
be attacked is x, the correct category of the image is y, and
the added disturbance is L; then, the adversarial attack can
be regarded as the optimal solution to solve the following
problem.
min
L
‖L‖ s.t. F (x+ L) 6= y, x+ L ∈ Rm.
If F (x + L) only needs to be different from the original
category y, we call such an attack a non-targeted attack, but
if it is a pre-specified category, it is called a targeted attack.
Next, we introduce several gradient-based attack strategies
similar to the algorithm in this paper.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [15]: Training neural
networks is a process that minimizes the loss function. If we
find the gradient of the model to the input, adding a small
perturbation L in the gradient direction to increase the loss
value will most likely result in a change in the classification.
L =  · sign(5xJ(µ, x, y)),
where  is the threshold for adding the perturbation, J(µ, x, y)
is the loss of the network with input x, and the sign function
is used to indicate the specific direction of the gradient.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [24]: This is a multiple
iteration version of FGSM, which applies the FGSM algorithm
multiple times and crops the pixel values after each iteration
to meet the perturbation limits in a reasonable range. Let x∗t
denote the adversarial example generated by the t-th iteration,
and then,
x∗t+1 = clipx,(x
∗
t + α · sign(5xJ(µ, x∗t , y))).
Iterative Least-likely Class Method (L.L.Class) [24]:
Similar to BIM, it uses iterative FGSM; however, the algo-
rithm aims to classify the image into the least likely class
yLL = argmin(F (x)). The main idea of the algorithm is to
maximize logFyLL(x) by adding perturbations in the negative
gradient direction −sign(5xJ(µ, x, yLL)):
x∗t+1 = clipx,(x
∗
t − α · sign(5xJ(µ, x∗t , yLL))).
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-
FGSM) [14]: A one-step perturbation in the gradient direction
may not achieve the purpose of an attack, and the simple
iterative FGSM may fall into a local optimum; therefore,
the momentum is integrated into FGSM to maintain a stable
direction change of the perturbation.
gt+1 = γ · gt + 5xJ(µ, x
∗
t , y)
‖5xJ(µ, x∗t , y)‖1
,
x∗t+1 = x
∗
t +  · sign(gt+1),
where gt collects the gradient of the first t iterations, and if the
attenuation factor γ is 0, the algorithm degenerates to BIM.
In addition to the above gradient-based attacks, Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [25] estimated the decision boundary of the
classifier through multiple iterations and generated the pertur-
bation by calculating the distance. Papernet et al. [26] attacked
the sample by maintaining a saliency map and modifying only
a small number of pixels. Carlini et al. [27] designed three
attack methods by limiting the L0, L2, and L∞ norms. Su et al.
[28] only modified one pixel to successfully attack the image
through differential evolution. Chen et al. [29] attempted to
solve the problem of adversarial attacks by describing it as an
elastic network regularization optimization problem. Xie et al.
[30] performed a random transformation of the input image to
maximize the loss function of the network for the attack. Hos-
seini et al. [31] proposed the concept of a semantic adversarial
example, which may have a large number of modifications to
the pixel but can maintain the original semantic features of
the image. Inspired by semantic preservation, Peng et al. [32]
proposed using structure-preserving transformation to generate
semantic adversarial samples.
C. Adversarial Defense
The security of DNNs is an important concern that needs
to be resolved [12]. It is natural to think of incorporating
the adversarial samples into the training set to allow the
model to learn the characteristics of the perturbations [15],
but the effect is very limited. Inspired by network distillation,
Papernot et al. [33] proposed using a distillation technology
to hide the model gradient, and thus defend against gradient-
based attacks. An ensemble of the networks was shown to
have significant effects on improving the robustness of the
model [14], [34]. Bhagoji et al. [35] used data dimension
reduction and principal component analysis to enhance the
robustness of the model. Buckman et al. [36] proposed a
thermometer code to resist adversarial attacks by modifying
the network structure. Samangouei et al. [37] proposed the
use of generative adversarial networks to eliminate the noise
from potentially dangerous samples. Jia et al. [38] proposed
a ComDefend model for end-to-end image compression and
reconstruction of images for defense. There are also some
defense methods based on denoising that attempt to eliminate
the effects of perturbations [39]–[41].
Many detection methods are based on the statistical knowl-
edge to find anomalies of adversarial samples [42]–[44]. Lu
et al. [45] designed an RBF-SVM to detect the existence of
adversaries by studying the different characteristics of the
adversarial images and clean images after passing through
the ReLU layer. Liang et al. [46] determined whether the
sample is disturbed by comparing the image entropy before
and after adaptive denoising for the given sample. Lee et al.
[47] used Mahalanobis distance to define the scores for class-
like Gaussian distributions to distinguish adversarial samples
and non-distribution samples.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Main Idea
The existing gradient-based attacks are mostly FGSM and
its variants. Because the training of the DNN converges in
the direction of loss reduction by updating the weights in the
gradient decent direction, these methods attempt to increase
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Fig. 2. Use different perturbation sizes  to attack the image. The first column is the original image, and the following columns are the images after the
attacks using  = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3.
the loss by introducing a slight perturbation in the gradient
direction to make model suggest a wrong prediction. Further,
these methods have indeed achieved obvious attack effects
[14].
However, it must be noted that adding a perturbation in
the gradient direction does not necessarily increase the loss
and cause the model to predict errors. We can look at two
examples attacked by FGSM, as shown in Fig. 2. From left to
right, as the size of the perturbation increases, the classifiers
still have high confidence that can be correctly classified.
When  is 0.3, the added noise causes a serious deformation
to the image; however, the classifier still has the correct
classification with more than 90% confidence. This shows
that there are some cases in which a small enough (tolerant)
disturbance in the gradient direction cannot cause classifier
misclassification, which is possible in highly complex neural
networks. Moreover, in the first row of Fig. 2, when  is 0.1,
0.2, and 0.3, the confidence classified as the category of frog
is higher than the confidence when  is 0.05. Therefore, in the
gradient direction, as the amount of disturbance increases, the
prediction confidence of the model for the correct category
does not necessarily decrease.
From the above phenomena, it is clear that the effective
attack directions for the samples may not be near the gradient,
and they may also be deviated greatly from the gradient
direction. In this paper, RDA based on a hill climbing search
is proposed for identifying an effective attack direction.
Hill climbing is an iterative local optimization algorithm to
solve optimization problems. It starts from a random solution
and attempts to find a better solution by moving the current
solution to its better/best neighbor. If the better solution is
found, it replaces the current solution. These steps are repeated
until no better solution (neighbors) can be found. Based on the
strategy of selecting the next solution, different types of hill
climbing approaches can be employed: steepest hill climbing
selects the best solution from the candidate neighbors; random
hill climbing selects the candidate neighbors randomly; first-
choice hill climbing of selecting the first random neighbors;
and random restart hill climbing restarts the algorithm when
the search fails [48].
B. Random Directional Attack
1) Strategies: The selection of the attack direction in RDA
is based on first-choice hill climbing. Each iteration randomly
seeks the first direction that can reduce the confidence of the
attacked category by randomly rotating a small angle in the
current direction. Of course, there may be other more advanced
optimization algorithms for solving the optimal disturbance
direction problem than hill climbing, such as simulated an-
nealing [49] and evolutionary algorithms [50]. However, in a
demanding real-time attack system, the relative simplicity of
the hill climbing method makes it easier to converge to an
effective attack. To reduce the time complexity and solve the
problem of being trapped in a local optimum, our algorithm
uses several strategies as follows.
• The gradient direction is used as the initial direction:
Instead of randomly generating the initial point as the
general hill climbing, we use the gradient direction as the
initial solution. Although attacks in the gradient direction
may not be able to successfully attack the model, the
gradient-based methods such as FGSM provide inspira-
tion in that a direction that may reduce the probability
of the attacked category can be selected as a candidate
when searching for the effective attack direction.
• Rotation on a random part of dimensions: If all
dimensions are rotated, the direction change will be large.
That is, if the step size in the hill climbing is too long, it
may skip the optimal value. Therefore, we choose a part
of dimensions to rotate, and to enhance the diversity of
the search, the rotation dimensions of each iteration are
randomly selected.
• Variety of rotation angles: The angle of rotation in
each iteration of hill climbing is uniformly selected
5Algorithm 1 RDA
Input: The original image x, true class y, and the trained
model F (x, µ)
Output: The adversarial example x∗
1: initialize success = False, i = 0
2: ~v0 = 5xJ(µ, x, y)
3: cur best = Fy(x+  · sign(~v0))
4: repeat
5: R = Generate Rotation Matrix Set()
6: shuffle(R)
7: Setp Forward = false
8: for j = 1 to len(R) do
9: P = F (x+  · sign(Rj · ~vi))
10: if argmax(P ) 6= y or Py < cur best then
11: cur best = Py
12: success = (argmax(P ) 6= y)
13: ~vi+1 = Rj · ~vi
14: i++
15: Setp Forward = true
16: break
17: end if
18: end for
19: until success == True or Setp Forward == false
20: return x+  · sign(~vi)
within a large range, which makes it possible for some
dimensions to change significantly. This could increase
the exploration ability of the algorithm and maintain the
diversity of the searched solutions.
2) Algorithm Framework: Although some works show that
an one-step attack of FGSM has a limited attack performance
[13], [14], the RDA proposed in this paper still uses the one-
step attack. We will prove that one-step attacks are feasible,
and we will further improve the performance of such attacks.
The method of generating an adversarial example by RDA is
as follows:
x∗ = x+  · sign(~v) (1)
This formula is similar to that used in FGSM; however,
it is important to note that ~v here indicates the direction of
the successful attack, which is not necessarily the direction
of gradient. We use first-choice hill climbing and combine the
three strategies described above to obtain the specific direction
to achieve a successful attack. We call the attack method based
on random but not arbitrary direction as a random directional
attack, and the specific procedure is shown in Alg. 1.
First, the gradient of the model for the input x is calculated
and set as the initial direction. Let cur best denote the
confidence that the sample disturbed is classified into the true
category y. The initial cur best is set to the confidence that
the sample disturbed at the gradient direction is classified into
the true category y (we select the confidence of category y
as the evaluation index, and search the attack direction by
minimizing this value).
Then, in each subsequent iteration, we construct the rotation
matrix set and shuffle it. The first rotation matrix that made
Algorithm 2 Generate Rotation Matrix Set
Input: The number of dimensions m, number of selected
dimensions l (l is an even number), and rotation angle range
[−θ, θ]
Output: The rotation matrix set R
1: initialize set R = emptyset()
2: for β = −θ to θ do //except β = 0
3: randomly select l dimensions from m dimensions to
compose a vector v = [v1, v2, ..., vl]
4: initialize r to an m-dimensional unit matrix
5: for i = 0 to l/2− 1 do
6: rv[2i],v[2i+1] =
[
cos(β) sin(β)
−sin(β) cos(β)
]
7: end for
8: R = R ∪ {r}
9: end for
10: return R
the cur best smaller is selected, and it is used to update
cur best and the attack direction. If the direction at the end of
an iteration can cause a misclassification, the attack succeeds
and the algorithm ends. If all rotation matrices cannot make
cur best smaller, the attack fails and the algorithm ends.
It should be noted that, according to (1), although RDA uses
multiple iterations to determine the attack direction, the attack
is essentially a one-step attack. In addition, under white-box
attacks, RDA takes the gradient direction of the target model as
the initial direction; However, under black-box attacks, RDA
takes the gradient direction of the substitute model as the initial
direction.
3) Generating a Rotation Matrix Set: The procedure for
generating a rotation matrix set in line 5 of Alg. 1 is shown
in Alg. 2.
For a specific angle β, on the basis of the identity matrix,
we rotate two dimensions rv[i],v[i+1] in turn, as shown in line
6 of Alg. 2. After all selected l dimensions are rotated, the
rotation matrix is obtained.
In the experiments, owing to the particularity of the rotation
matrix, we do not even need to generate a specific rotation
matrix set for each iteration. In addition, we do not need to
store the entire rotation matrix set. We only need to calculate
rv[0],v[1] for each angle β, and only store rv[0],v[1] as well
as the selected l dimensions for each angle β. Furthermore,
at lines 9 and 13 in Alg. 1, there is no need to perform
complex matrix multiplication, and only a simple rotation
of the selected l dimensions is required. The number of
multiplications for calculating each of the two dimensions is 4,
and the total number of multiplications is l/2×4 = 2l, which
is independent of the dimensions (m) of the direction vector.
Thus, matrix preservation and matrix multiplication required
for the traditional angle rotation are inexpensive in RDA.
Now, we consider the similarity between the current di-
rection and rotated direction vectors. Although the selected
dimensions may rotate at a larger angle according to strategies
mentioned in section III-B1 (such as greater than 90 degrees or
even 180 degrees), from the viewpoint of the entire direction
vector, it does not violate the basic hill climbing strategy of
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Fig. 3. The simplified contour map of loss.
selecting the neighbors (small step size; here, the rotation
angle). Let the direction vectors before and after the rotation
be A and B, respectively. If the similarity of A and B is
measured by cosine similarity, then,
similarity(A,B) =
A ·B
‖A‖ ‖B‖
=
∑m
i=1Ai ×Bi√∑m
i=1(Ai)
2 ×√∑mi=1(Bi)2 .
Let the number of selected dimensions be l. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the first l dimensions are selected.
Considering that the lengths of the two vectors before and
after the rotation are equal, we have
similarity(A,B) =
∑l
i=1Ai ×Bi +
∑m
i=l+1(Ai)
2∑m
i=1(Ai)
2
= 1−
∑l
i=1Ai × (Ai −Bi)∑m
i=1(Ai)
2
≥ 1−
∑l
i=1 2(Ai)
2∑m
i=1(Ai)
2
≈ 1− 2l
m
.
When l is 10, the similarity will be no less than 0.993
for a CIFAR-10 image of size 32 × 32 × 3, and not less
than 0.9999 for an ImageNet image of size 224 × 224 × 3.
The minimum value is obtained by rotating 180 degrees, and
therefore, the extreme rotation of 180 degrees produces only
a slight change to the entire direction vector. Therefore, the
basic search strategy of selecting neighbors is not violated.
4) Analysis: To more visually analyze RDA and the related
attacks, we illustrate the directions of such attacks in Fig.
3. This can be seen as a contour map of loss (loss in high-
dimensional space is often very complex; here, it is expressed
as a simple contour map for the ease of analysis), where the
loss of points on each line is the same.
The gradient direction of each point on the image will be in
a direction vertical to the contour. Further, if the loss function
of the neural network adopts cross entropy, i.e.,
loss = −
∑
i
pi(x)log(Fi(x)),
where pi(x) represents the probability that the classifier clas-
sifies input x as category i, for the single-label classifier that
uses the one-hot encoded label vector, loss = −log(Fy(x)).
Therefore, Fig. 3 could be used to represent the classification
confidence contour map of the true category.
First, we consider the point A in Fig. 3. The direction
−−→
AB
represents the gradient direction of point A. We assume that
the shadow in the figure is the adversarial region, and the
point reaching the area can cause misclassification (note that
the adversarial region is complex, and the increasing loss only
represents that the adversarial example is more likely to be
generated; this is not absolute. We have simplified this here).
Therefore, if a perturbation such as the size of |−−→AB| is added
along the gradient direction
−−→
AB at point A to reach point B in
the adversarial area, an adversarial example can be generated.
This is the main idea of the attack of FGSM.
However, the high complexity of DNNs also makes the case
not always true. If the input x is at point C, the gradient
direction is along the direction of
−−→
CD. It can be observed that
when the perturbation is added along the gradient direction at
point C, the loss after adding a perturbation of size |−−→CG| is
smaller than the loss of adding a smaller perturbation |−−→CD|.
This explains the phenomenon in Fig. 2 that the predicted
probability does not decrease as the size of the perturbation
increases. Moreover, regardless of how much perturbation is
added to the direction
−−→
CD, it cannot be moved to the adver-
sarial area, which is the limitation of the FGSM. Therefore, a
variety of iterative-based gradient direction attacks are derived,
which approach the adversarial area by multiple movements
toward the gradient direction, such as C → D → E → F in
Fig. 3. Of course, they achieved a better attack effect.
These iterative-based methods lead us to think as follows:
should we use multiple steps to reach the adversarial region?
Let us consider point C again. If we do not base the gradient
direction and add a perturbation of size |−−→CH| along the
direction of
−−→
CH , point C moves to point H in the adversarial
region, producing the same effect as the iterative version of
FGSM. The random directional attack we proposed could
make the attack direction move from the gradient direction−−→
CD to
−−→
CH steadily through the idea of the hill climbing
together with three strategies in section III-B1; finally, we
realize the one-step attack successfully. In the next section,
we further demonstrate the effectiveness of RDA attack by
the experiment.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
In this section, first, we introduce the experimental settings
of the dataset and models training, and then comprehensively
test the attack performance of RDA. Finally, we compare the
proposed RDA with the typical gradient-based attacks.
7A. Experimental Setup
Our experiments are based on cleverhans [51], which is a
standardized implementation of most current classical attack
methods, including FGSM, L.L.Class, BIM, and MI-FGSM.
Our source code is available at https://github.com/Daftstone/
Random-Directional-Attack.
1) Datasets: To verify the reliability and versatility of our
algorithm, four commonly used datasets, i.e., MNIST, SVHN,
CIFAR-10, and ImageNet, were used in the experiments.
The MNIST and SVHN datasets contain images with 10
numbers from 0-9. The MNIST consists of a grayscale image
of size 28 × 28, and the SVHN consists of color images of
size 32 × 32. SVHN is a natural image set extracted from
the house number photographed by Google Street View, and
therefore, the processing of this dataset is more complicated
and difficult. CIFAR-10 contains 32 × 32 color images of
10 mutually exclusive categories such as airplanes, trucks,
dogs, and frogs. To verify the attack performance of RDA on
high resolution images, we chose the ImageNet dataset. We
extracted a subset of 10 categories (ImageNet-10) for testing.
The selection of these 10 categories is consistent with Im-
agenette (https://github.com/fastai/imagenette), including golf,
parachute, and tent, and all images are resized to 224×224×3;
the average number of samples per category is about 1000.
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (%)
model MNIST SVHN CIFAR-10 ImageNet-10
Target 99.24 96.29 91.37 91.80
Substitute 99.33 94.64 89.88 89.40
2) Model Training: We tested the white-box and black-
box attacks separately, and therefore, the target model to be
attacked and the substitute model for the black-box attack are
required for each dataset.
For MNIST, we use a simple 7-layer CNN structure as the
target model and another 8-layer CNN model as a substitute
model. For the SVHN dataset, both the target model and
the substitute model use a 7-layer CNN structure; however,
the structure used is different. CIFAR-10 uses a simple and
practical VGG-16 as the target model and ResNet-32 as
the substitute model. ImageNet-10 uses a more advanced
lightweight network MobileNet and MobileNetV2 as the target
and substitute models, respectively.
The training process for the four datasets is the same. First,
the images are normalized to [0, 1], and the initial learning rate
is set to 0.001. If the accuracy of the test set is not improved,
the current learning rate is reduced by 70%. We use the Adam
optimizer and data augmentation operations including rotation,
horizontal vertical shift, and horizontal flip. All datasets are
trained for 100 epochs. At the end of the training, a good
classification accuracy was achieved in the four datasets, as
shown in Table I.
For all datasets, the samples misclassified by the models
are not considered when we run the algorithms to generate
the adversarial examples.
B. Experimental Results
In this section, we use white-box attacks for empirically
analyses.
1) Number of Selected Dimensions: RDA uses randomly
selected dimensions to ensure the diversity of the search and
to cover as many directions as possible. This section examines
the effect of the number of selected dimensions l on the
success rate of attacks. We set l to the nth power of 2 and all
dimensions m in the experiments, and the angle of rotation is
180 degrees. The experimental results obtained by calculating
the attack success rate when  is 0.03, 0.05, and 0.1 are shown
in Fig. 4.
As can be seen from Fig. 4, in each dataset, as the number of
dimensions increases from left to right, the attack success rate
decreases, and in most cases, the worst attack performance
occurs when selecting to rotate all dimensions. This also
justifies the rationality of this paper using a part of the
dimensions for rotation. Choosing more dimensions may not
help identify the feasible direction, i.e., the hill climbing search
may skip over the feasible directions.
Although choosing a very small number of dimensions can
help obtain better attack performance, the number of iterations
that RDA needs to search for the effective direction might
be larger. We counted the average number of iterations used
to find the effective attack directions for the samples that
could not be successfully attacked in the gradient direction,
as shown in Fig. 5. As expected, the number of iterations is
relatively large when less dimensions are selected. Further, as
the number of dimensions increases, the number of iterations
is reduced significantly. We recommend that the number of
selected dimensions is better when it is between 10 and 100.
2) Angles of Rotation: The rotation angle of the RDA is
[−θ, θ], and one point is selected for every 1 degree in this
range. Thus, the number of candidate directions per iteration is
2θ (excluding 0 degree). A larger θ means that more directions
can be selected, which can effectively prevent the algorithm
from terminating because a local optima can be found in the
failure attack direction. However, a larger θ also means that
the number of candidate directions at each iteration increases,
resulting in an increase in time complexity. Therefore, the size
of the selected angle plays a key role in the attack performance
and computational efficiency.
We test the attack performance of θ from 1 to 180 degrees,
respectively, and set the number of selected dimensions l in
RDA to 10. The results are shown in Fig. 6. Fig. 6 indicates
that the attack performance first gradually increases as θ
increases, and when a certain value is reached, the attack
performance saturates. At this point, increasing θ only results
in increased computational complexity but no improvement
in performance. The performances for SVHN, CIFAR-10, and
ImageNet-10 reach the upper limit when θ is about 60 degrees,
and for MNIST, when θ is about 90.
3) Attack Direction: The direction of RDA is often dif-
ferent from that of the gradient. This section experimentally
calculates the included angles between the attack directions
and the gradient directions to observe their relationships. We
obtain the cosine similarity between the attack direction and
8Fig. 4. The effect of the number of selected dimensions l on the attack performance. The results of testing on MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-10
are from left to right and then top to bottom.
Fig. 5. The relationship between the number of selected dimensions l and the average number of iterations required by the algorithm. The results on the four
datasets MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-10 are shown from left to right.
Fig. 6. The impact of the selected angle on attack performance. Experimental results on MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-10 are given from left to
right.
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Fig. 7. Some examples of RDA attack the classifier in ImageNet-10. The first line lists clean examples, the second line lists adversarial examples generated
by the RDA ( = 0.03). The description below each picture indicates the category predicted by the classifier and the degrees in the parentheses are the
included angle between the attack direction and the gradient direction.
TABLE II
INTERSECTION ANGLE OF RDA DIRECTION AND GRADIENT DIRECTION
Dataset

0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2
min max mean min max mean min max mean min max mean
MNIST 1.79 90.00 64.68 0.72 90.00 70.85 2.86 90.00 79.77 1.43 90.00 85.42
SVHN 2.23 90.00 52.82 0.70 90.00 76.40 0.47 90.00 31.04 0.47 90.00 25.50
CIFAR-10 2.67 89.56 30.97 1.28 89.52 24.22 1.55 89.03 20.23 0.75 53.68 18.34
ImageNet-10 8.73 90.00 68.48 3.95 90.00 75.07 4.92 90.00 60.99 2.12 90.00 56.89
Fig. 8. The distribution of the included angles between the direction of the RDA and the gradient direction. The results from left to right are from MNIST,
FMNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10, respectively.
the gradient direction and take the inverse cosine result as the
included angle between the two directions.
For samples that FGSM can successfully attack, the in-
cluded angles between the attack direction and the gradient
direction obtained by RDA mostly are very small; therefore,
we only discuss the attack directions of the samples that FGSM
cannot attack successfully but the RDA can. The number of
selected dimensions l by the RDA is 10, and the rotation
angle θ in the experiments is 180 degrees. The results are
summarized in Table II.
As can be seen from Table II, although the minimum
included angle is small, the maximum included angle is 90◦.
The average included angle is relatively large, especially for
MNIST and ImageNet-10 (above 50◦). This demonstrates that
effective attack directions are not always in the vicinity of
the gradient direction, and there may exist a large deviation
from the gradient direction. We have listed several examples of
using RDA to attack ImageNet-10, as shown in Fig. 7. It can
also be seen from the figure that the successful attack direction
of RDA does not need to be near the gradient direction.
In addition, for  gradually increasing from 0.03 to 0.2,
the included angle between the direction of the RDA and the
gradient direction has no obvious laws. Further, we count the
distribution of the included angles under the four datasets
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when  is 0.1, as shown in Fig. 8. We can see that the
distribution of the included angles of the four datasets is also
different.
4) Number of Iterations: We already briefly analyzed the
relationship between the selected dimensions and the number
of iterations. In this section, we discuss the number of itera-
tions required for the RDA to search for the attack direction.
The parameter l of RDA is 10, and the parameter θ is 180.
We count the average iterations for all samples (AS) and
the average iterations for samples (only RDAS) that FGSM
could not successfully attack but RDA was able to successfully
attack, as shown in Table III.
For samples that can be successfully attacked in the gradient
direction, RDA requires only a few iterations; therefore, the
number of iterations of AS is smaller than only RDAS. Table
III indicates that, as  increases, the number of required
iterations decreases. This means that larger perturbations make
it easier to find the feasible attack direction.
For CIFAR-10, only RDAS and AS require fewer iterations.
However, on MNIST and SVHN, when the  is very small, the
number of iterations is relatively large. On the ImageNet-10
dataset, the number of iterations in the algorithm is generally
large. This is because the selected 10 dimensions are very
small relative to the direction vector of 150528 dimensions.
Therefore, even if the attack direction and the gradient di-
rection are slightly different, a large number of iterations are
required to arrive at a successful attack direction.
C. Comparison of Results
We compared RDA with classical gradient-based attack
methods such as FGSM, L.L.Class, BIM, and MI-FGSM. We
compared the attack success rate under both the white-box
attack and the black-box attack. In this part of the experiments,
we set l to 10 and θ to 180 (it is impossible to know the specific
dataset in practice; therefore, θ is set to the maximum value
of 180 here).
1) White-box Attack: Table IV lists the comparisons be-
tween the proposed RDA and the other four methods in the
case of white-box attacks.
The performance of RDA is competitive; in many cases,
RDA achieves the highest attack performance. Especially, in
CIFAR-10, our method successfully attacks all test samples
using five sizes of perturbations. Although the success rate of
RDA attacking MNIST is only 9.21% when  is 0.03, RDA
still has the best performance compared with the other four
attacks.
Among the four methods that are compared, only BIM and
MI-FGSM have attack performances similar to that of our al-
gorithm; however, both methods are based on iterative attacks.
While RDA uses multiple iterations to determine the attack
direction, the attack is essentially a one-step attack. FGSM
and L.L.Class have relatively inferior attack performances.
Although both RDA and FGSM use a one-step attack, the
success rate of RDA attacks is mostly higher than FGSM by
more than 10%. Further, when  was 0.1 on MNIST, the attack
success rate increased from 44.63% for FGSM to 96.21% for
RDA, which is the best when compared to that for all other
methods. The above results indicate that RDA has excellent
performance in white-box attacks.
2) Black-box Attack: In reality, we often cannot obtain
the internal parameters of the model. The classifier often
only serves as a black box and can only obtain the final
classification results. In general, the black-box attack will train
a substitute network, and then attack the target model using
the adversarial samples obtained under the trained substitute
model. RDA takes the gradient direction of the substitute
model as the initial direction; however, the search for the
attack direction only needs the output of the model (probability
labels), and therefore, the target model can be directly used
for searching in RDA.
The final attack performance is summarized in Table V.
Compared to the white-box attack, the attack performances of
the four comparison methods decrease significantly, while the
attack performance of RDA does not change much in most
cases.
For MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR-10, the attack performance
of RDA is comparable to that of the white-box attack. In
particular, in CIFAR-10, all test samples can be successfully
attacked as in the white-box attack.
For ImageNet-10, when comparing the white-box attacks,
the performance of RDA is degraded when  is 0.03 and 0.05.
However, RDA is significantly superior that the other methods
as their performance decreases sharply.
Gradient-based methods such as FGSM in particular rely on
the internal parameters of the model, and in some cases, the
model itself is not differentiable, which limits the applications
of such methods in a black-box attack. RDA ignores all
internal features of the target model to make it effective in
the more demanding black-box attack.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed RDA for generating adversarial
samples; RDA uses the one-step attack, the attack direction is
obtained using the hill climbing search, and it is not neces-
sarily in the gradient direction. Moreover, RDA can conduct
attacks with only the model output but without the internal
knowledge of the target model. Therefore, under the black-
box attack, RDA can achieve a similar performance as that of
the white-box attack in most cases, which is difficult to achieve
using other gradient-based attack methods. Although RDA is
very simple, it has a very competitive attack performance when
compared to the other gradient-based methods.
The experimental results indicated that the included angles
between the effective attack direction and the gradient direc-
tion vary considerably. In fact, the effective attack directions
by RDA might deviate greatly from the gradient direction. In
the future, to design a one-step attack, we will attempt to study
more efficient methods to search the effective attack direction.
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